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Abstract—Peer-to-peer paradigm is increasingly employed for
organizing distributed resources for various applications, e.g.
content distribution, open storage grid etc. In open environments,
even when proper access control mechanisms supervise the access
to the resources, privacy issues may arise depending on the
application. In this paper, we introduce, PANACEA, a system
that offers high and tunable privacy based on an innovative
resource indexing approach. In our case, privacy has two aspects:
the deducibility of a resource’s existence/non-existence and the
discovery of the provider of the resource. We systematically
study the privacy that can be provided by the proposed system
and compare its effectiveness as related to conventional P2P
systems. Employing both probabilistic and information-theoretic
approaches, we analytically derive that PANACEA can offer high
privacy, while preserving high search efficiency for authorized
users. Our analysis and the effectiveness of the approach have
been experimentally verified. Moreover, the privacy offered by
the proposed system can be tuned according to the specific
application needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are increasingly used in many
distributed application domains, e.g. content distribution, file
sharing, open storage grids, video streaming, etc. However,
users typically expect to be able to use these systems to share
access-controlled and (semi-) private data. Conventional P2P
systems should be properly adapted to meet the access control
requirements of such applications. Typical approaches for data
access control in open environments include cryptographic
methods [1], Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies,
and trust-based methods [2], which require complicated key
distribution and management. We consider a simpler, yet
effective, approach for data access control in P2P systems:
We assume that resources reside at the publisher nodes itself,
to ensure that access control is enforced safely in an untrusted
P2P environment. A user directly presents his credentials to
the publishing peer of a particular resource after locating the
resource in the P2P overlay. The publishing peer replies the
query after applying its local authorization policies.
P2P systems typically try to maximize search efficiency. To
this extreme, structured P2P systems, such as Kademlia [3]
etc., employ an index implemented as a Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) over the P2P overlay. Such an index typically consists
of index entries of the form (key; value)-pairs, where the key
is the resource identifier (often produced by one-way hash
functions, e.g. MD5), while the value is the peer identifier,
where the resource is stored. Indeed, as shown in [3], such
an index significantly improves the search costs, in terms of
both query latency and communication overhead. However, as
index entries are hosted on arbitrary and often untrusted nodes,
access to the index entries cannot be controlled by the peers
that publish their data to the index. Thus, the index reveals both
the existence/non-existence and the location (i.e. publishing
peer) of each queried resource, hence, data privacy is breached.
We refer to the former privacy aspect concerning resource
existence/non-existence as resource privacy, while the latter
one concerning resource location as provider privacy. On the
other extreme, unstructured P2P systems, such as Gnutella
(gnutella.com), employ no index and limited-hop flooding is
used for locating the queried data, which incurs high latency
and communication overhead, yet, with no guarantees on the
data discovery. However, if access-controlled, unstructured
P2P systems can provide the highest data privacy by answering
queries only to authorized users. Thus, there is a trade-off
between search efficiency and data privacy in this context.
In this paper, we explore this trade-off and propose a Pri-
vAcy preserviNg Access-ControllEd (PANACEA) P2P system
that combines high data privacy (both resource and provider
privacies) and high search efficiency for authorized users.
We carefully quantify privacy offered by PANACEA, em-
ploying both probabilistic modeling and information-theoretic
approaches. We also analytically study the search effi-
ciency/overhead of the PANACEA, as related to structured
and unstructured P2P systems. The parameters of PANACEA
can be tuned so that the trade-off between privacy and search
efficiency is set according to the application needs. Numeri-
cally evaluating our analytic results for practical systems and
verifying them with simulation experiments, we demonstrate
that, with proper values for the parameters of PANACEA,
authorized users almost always find the queried resources at
a very low search overhead; on the other hand, unauthorized
users can deduce the existence of a resource and its provider
with a very low probability. Moreover, the communication
overhead is high for unauthorized users. According to our
information-theoretic analysis, PANACEA can tolerate large
groups of collusive adversaries without compromising privacy.
Figure 1 illustrates the position of PANACEA as related
to structured and unstructured P2P access-controlled systems
in the three-dimensional space <provider privacy, resource
privacy, search efficiency>, employing the terminology of [4].
A resource privacy of 0 refers to the case that the adversary
cannot deduce the existence/nonexistence of a resource. To
the best of our knowledge, PANACEA is the first approach
that concurrently addresses resource and provider privacies in
access-controlled systems.
Fig. 1. Position of various systems on privacy and search efficiency axes.
Note that the specific authorization policy and the format of
credentials are orthogonal to current scope of the paper. As a
result, PANACEA mechanism can be employed by providers
with different access control techniques, such as role-based
access control, discretionary access control or attribute-based
access control, all existing in the system simultaneously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II, we describe the publishing and searching mechanisms
in PANACEA. In Section III, we analytically derive the privacy
properties and the search overhead employing a probabilistic
approach. We also quantify the entropies of the system re-
garding resource and provider privacies. In Section IV, we
verify our analysis and present our simulation experiments that
demonstrate the effectiveness and the tunability of the system.
In Section V, we discuss the related work. Finally, in Section
VI, we conclude our work.
II. THE PANACEA SYSTEM
In this section, we present the proposed PANACEA system
and explain how the resource and provider privacies are
achieved. As already mentioned, resource privacy concerns
hiding the existence and the non-existence of resources: an
unauthorized user should not be able to determine either of
them. Our system aims to combine look up efficiency of struc-
tured P2P systems with high resource and provider privacies
offered by unstructured ones. PANACEA employs a DHT
that hosts a resource and provider privacy-preserving (RPP)
index. However, as explained later in this section, PANACEA
indexes only a subset of the resources into the DHT; this is
a necessary characteristic for providing resource privacy. The
rest of the resources are located by flooding, similarly to the
unstructured P2P systems. As a result, PANACEA acts partly
as as a structured P2P system and partly as an unstructured
one for the resources not indexed in the DHT.
The proposed indexing mechanism consists of tunable pa-
rameters that allow the application designer to choose between
strong privacy guarantees and increased search efficiency
based on the specific application needs. This tuning of the
privacy parameters determines the position of the resulting
system in the graph of Figure 1, as compared to structured
and unstructured P2P systems. We describe the publishing
Fig. 2. Privacy preserving publishing in PANACEA
and search mechanisms of PANACEA in Section II-A and
in Section II-B respectively.
A. Privacy Preserving Publishing
PANACEA achieves the resource and provider privacy goals
with an innovative privacy-aware publishing mechanism, illus-
trated in Figure 2, which involves:
1) Probabilistic publishing of resources
2) RPP index generation
3) Randomized forwarding
4) Insertion into the DHT
This approach is described as follows:
1) Probabilistic publishing: Instead of publishing every re-
source into the DHT, as in structured P2P systems, PANACEA
announces a resource with a system-defined probability 
(as shown in Figure 2) and creates an RPP-index entry as
described later. Therefore, absence of an index entry for a
specific resource key in the DHT does not necessarily mean
non-existence of the corresponding resource in the system.
Due to probabilistic publishing, PANACEA acts as a hybrid
semi-structured P2P system. All the resources, which are
not announced in the DHT, are discovered using limited-hop
flooding with a system-defined time-to-live (TTL).
2) RPP index generation: We employ k-anonymization
techniques [5] to achieve both resource and provider privacies
for the resources selected to be announced into the DHT by the
probabilistic publishing phase. A k-anonymization technique
typically anonymizes a data item by hiding it inside a list of k
data items so that an adversary cannot identify it. Specifically,
instead of having a (key; value) pair as an index entry for a
resource, as in structured P2P systems, we propose that the
index entry pair consists of a list of keys and a list of values,
i.e. (key[]; value[]), which is derived by applying resource
and provider anonymization that are subsequently explained.
We refer to such an index entry as (m;n)-index entry, where
m refers to cardinality of the key list and n refers to that
of the value list. In this terminology, an index entry of the
conventional structured P2P systems can be seen as a (1; 1)-
index entry.
Regarding resource anonymization, once a new resource
is chosen to be published, its corresponding (1; 1)-index is
converted to an (m; 1)-index by adding m  1 resource keys
randomly selected (that may correspond to genuine or phantom
resources) from a resource namespace R to the key list of
the index entry. The resource namespace R can be domain-
specific or span multiple domains and even contain words
and their combinations from a dictionary. Note that human-
readable plain text keys (i.e resource names) from R, which
are employed by the users to refer to the resources, are mapped
by a hash function h() to the system key space (i.e. resource
ids) K. When a resource name r is anonymized, in fact, its
key h(r) is anonymized among m keys. An adversary that is
able to observe the resource keys of the (m;n)-entry may be
able to derive the corresponding resource names of the m  1
keys by employing a dictionary attack. However, he will not
be able to deduce whether this entry corresponds to a genuine
resource or not.
After resource anonymization, the resulting (m; 1)-index
entry is fed to the provider anonymizer module, as depicted
in Figure 2. The provider list is populated with n number of
entries with the providing peer itself being one of them. The
other n   1 entries are randomly chosen from the Provider
Store (PStore) - a local database of provider ids. We assume
that PStores at each peer are initialized with a number of
well-known peers and its neighbours in the overlay, and then
incrementally expanded over time with unknown providers
contained in the (m;n)-entries traversing through the peer.
3) Randomized forwarding: After an (m;n)-index entry is
constructed by a publishing peer, it has to be inserted into the
P2P system using the DHT put() method. However, this index
entry must be published anonymously, as the next-hop node in
the DHT routing could easily deduce that the initiator node is
itself the publisher from the (m;n)-entry where it is contained.
In order to anonymize the node that initiates the insertion
request, we propose that a randomized forwarding phase (see
Figure 2) preceeds the DHT put() operation. Specifically,
each peer that receives the insertion request decides with a
system-defined probability  to forward it to a node randomly
selected from the n providers in the (m;n)-entry or initiate
the DHT routing with the put(m;n) method with probability
1 . The technique of randomized forwarding to anonymize
the original sender, was originally proposed in Crowds [4]
for anonymizing web access. However, in [4], the next-hop
node was randomly selected from the full set of cooperating
nodes before contacting the web server. Clearly, our case is
more complicated than the Crowds one, since the (m;n)-entry
contains the publisher itself. Hence, by randomly choosing
the next hop from the set of providers in the (m;n)-entry,
we achieve equal probability for each of them for being the
publisher. Note that randomized forwarding preceeds DHT
routing, and hence it does not demand any modifications to it.
The randomized forwarding phase introduces additional
communication overhead. This process can be viewed as a
geometric distribution with parameter . Therefore, if X is
the random variable that describes the number of hops of a
put() request, then the probability that it travels x hops before
it enters DHT routing is given by:
P (X = x) = x(1  )
The expected number of hops can be given by the mean of the
geometric distribution, i.e. E(X) = =1  . We assume that
PStore caches the IP address along with each provider id and
that the IP address for each provider is stored in the provider
list of the (m;n)-index entry. Thus, the relaying of put() can
happen in O(1).
4) Insertion into the DHT: Finally, for the insertion of the
(m;n)-entry into the DHT, put(m;n) operation is invoked,
which is implemented using the conventional put() method.
Note that the conventional put() method inserts only a (1; 1)-
index entry. Yet, the same method can be used to insert a (1; n)
entry, as the value field is not used in the DHT routing. Hence,
we propose to convert the put(m;n) request into m number
of put(1; n) requests, using each of the m keys as pivot ones.
Note that, since the keys in an index entry are chosen inde-
pendently by peers, key collisions (i.e. conflicts) in the DHT
are possible. Key collisions also happen when multiple copies
of the same resource are inserted into the DHT. We propose
that the list of providers in the new (m;n)-index entry is
simply appended to the list of already existing providers for the
collided key. A resource r with multiple copies is expected to
have a larger provider list than that of a resource published by
only one provider. However, as long as a genuine resource has
smaller or equal provider list size to the maximum one nf of a
phantom resource, an adversary cannot differentiate between
them. We propose an extension to our basic approach that
increases the provider list sizes of phantom keys. Specifically,
a peer randomly selects a small partition of the set R denoted
as RL (RL  R) and constantly employs RL for the resource
anonymization instead of R (referred to as RL-approach).
B. Searching
When a peer searches for a resource with key r, it executes
get(r). If an (m;n)-entry was published in the DHT having r
as one of its m ids, then the peer returns the provider list of
this entry to the searcher. Subsequently, the searcher contacts
all these providers, except for those where he knows from
prior transactions that he is not authorized to for the queried
resource. Once an index entry is found, a provider can be
reached in O(1), since its IP address is maintained in the
index entry along with the provider id. However, in case of
multiple providers for same resource, an (m;n)-index entry
for an existing resource may not contain all the providers of
that resource in the system because of probabilistic publishing
in PANACEA. In other words, the index entry is not always
complete. As a result, a searcher may not be able to reach
the provider where he is authorized through the RPP index.
Therefore, even if an (m;n)-index entry is present in the
index, the searcher may have to employ limited-hop flooding.
However, the probability that a query is flooded over the
overlay can be very low for resources with a few copies and
with proper selection of the publishing probability , as shown
in Section III. No provider responds to search queries from
unauthorized users.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analytically study the privacy offered by
PANACEA by employing probability theory and information
theory approaches. Moreover, we estimate the expected com-
munication overhead of our approach.
We use the following notation in our analysis. Let N be
the number of peers in the system and Nc be the expected
number of copies of a genuine resource r and Na  Nc be
the number of copies that a particular user is authorized to
access. We call a user as unauthorized to r, when he is not
authorized to access any of the Nc copies of r, i.e. Na = 0.
A. Probabilistic approach
We evaluate the privacy breach that can be achieved by a
user who has complete knowledge on the parameters of our
PANACEA system and queries the system for a particular
resource. We denote:
i) PK;a (resp. PK;u) as the probability for an authorized
(resp. unauthorized) user to deduce the existence of a
certain genuine resource.
ii) PV;a (resp. PV;u) as the probability for an authorized
(resp. unauthorized) user to deduce the provider of a
certain genuine resource.
iii) P  as the probability for an authorized or unauthorized
user to deduce the non-existence of a certain non-existing
resource.
Definition 1: An access-controlled system is said to provide
higher privacy if it promises:
i) Lower probabilities for PK;u, PV;u, which addresses an
unauthorized user deducing a resource’s presence and its
provider respectively.
ii) Lower probabilities for P , which addresses a user
deducing a resource’s non-existence.
Under this definition of privacy, any privacy-efficient access
control mechanism should aim to:
 Minimize PK;u, PV;u, P , which should ideally be 0 as
in unstructured P2P systems.
 Maximize search cost Cs;u for unauthorized users and
ideally close to that of the unstructured P2P systems.
However, the search efficiency of the privacy-enabling mech-
anism should remain high, i.e.:
 PK;a, PV;a should ideally be 1 (as in structured P2P
systems), and
 the search communication cost Cs;a should be kept low
and ideally close to that of the structured P2P systems.
We express the privacy and search cost metrics of
PANACEA in terms of the corresponding metrics of structured
and unstructured P2P systems. To this end, we use superscripts
U and S to denote metrics for unstructured and structured P2P
systems respectively, and no superscript for PANACEA, e.g.
PUK;u refers to unstructured systems and the equivalent metric
for PANACEA is PK;u.
First, we quantify provider privacy for an authorized user.
There are three cases that can arise:
Case (i): If any of the Na copies, where he is authorized to,
was published to the DHT, he could deduce the provider of the
resource with probability 1. The probability that at least one
of Na copies was published into the DHT is 1  (1  )Na .
Case (ii): On the other hand, consider the case that none
of the Na copies was published in the DHT (probability of
which, is (1   )Na ), but some i of the remaining Nc   Na
copies were published. Recall that if the user finds an (m;n)-
entry for r in the DHT, he contacts all the providers therein.
In this case, as an authorized copy of the resource would not
be located by contacting i n number of providers listed in the
DHT entry, the user would also employ flooding. Here, we
say that the user could deduce the provider with probability
1
in
in addition to what is possible to be deduced by flooding
(i.e., PUV;a). However, the number of providers is less than
i  n, because of “collisions” (i.e. provider id conflicts) in the
provider lists across the multiple (m;n) entries of the resource
copies. We account for this with a collision factor fv .
Case(iii): When a DHT entry is not found for the resource
key (probability of which is (1  )Nc )1, the user attempts to
deduce the provider by flooding (PUV;a). Hence,
PV;a =

1  (1  )Na

 1+
(1  )Na 
Nc NaX
i=1

Nc  Na
i

i(1  )(Nc Na i)


1
(i  n)(1  fv)
+ PUV;a

+ (1  )Nc  PUV;a :
(1)
We apply similar reasoning to formulate resource privacy
PK;a for an authorized user in addition to the following. Let
the maximum provider list size nf of a phantom resource key
be known to the user. Then, if the size of provider list of the
(m;n)-entry of the queried resource is larger than nf , the user
can deduce the existence of the resource in the system with
probability 1. Otherwise if it is smaller than nf , a probability
1
m
can be assigned to the existence, as the queried key is mixed
with m 1 other ones in the (m;n)-entry, in addition to what
can also be assigned by flooding (PUK;a). Therefore,
PK;a =

1  (1  )Na

 1 + (1  )Na  (1  (1  )Nc Na)
I
 
Nc NaX
i=1

Nc  Na
i

i(1  )(Nc Na i)(in)(1  fv)
!
+ (1  )Nc  PUK;a, where
I(l) =

1, for l  nf
PUK;a  1 + (1  P
U
K;a) 
1
m
, otherwise
ﬀ
:
(2)
Next, we quantify the search cost Cs;a in terms of the number
of messages generated because of a query from an authorized
user. First, a user searches in the DHT incuring cost CSs;a.
Thereafter, we account for two possible cases- none of Nc
copies or some i copies of the resource are published into the
DHT. The former case can happen with probability (1 )Nc
where the user employes flooding incuring a cost of CUs;a.
In the latter case, i  n number of providers are contacted. If
1In fact, a DHT entry can also be present for one resource, if its key was
inserted as a phantom one. However, we assume this probability as negligible,
as jRj is big as compared to the number of genuine resources.
none of them has an authorized copy (probability of which, is
(1  Na
Nc
)i), the user employs flooding. Overall, Cs;a:
Cs;a = C
S
s;a + (1  )
Nc  CUs;a +
NcX
i=1

Nc
i

i(1  )(Nc i)

"
i  n  (1  fv) +

1 
Na
Nc
i
CUs;a
#
(3)
We can derive the resource privacy PK;u, the provider privacy
PV;u, and the search cost Cs;u for an unauthorized user from
eq. (3) by setting Na = 0.
Finally, we derive P , i.e. the probability to deduce the
non-existence of a non-existing resource. Given an event space

 = fDHT,:DHTg that a non-existent resource is found or
not in the DHT respectively, P  is given by:
P  = Pr(  j 
) =Pr(  j :DHT)  Pr(:DHT)+
Pr(  j DHT)  Pr(DHT) ;where
Pr(  j :DHT) =PUK;u = 0
Pr(  j DHT) =
m  1
m
Pr(DHT) =
"
1 

1 
1
j R j
Nr(m 1)#
Pr(:DHT) =1  Pr(DHT)
(4)
Nr is the total number of resources in the system and R is the
resource namespace. Pr(  j :DHT) expresses the probability
that a resource is non-existent, given that it is not found in the
DHT. This is similar to the probability of deducing the exis-
tence of an unauthorized resource for a user in unstructured
P2P systems, because an existing resource is same as a non-
existing resource for an unauthorized user. Pr(  j DHT) is
the probability that the resource corresponding to the key does
not exist. Pr(DHT) expresses the probability that a phantom
resource from namespace R may have been inserted into the
index, while Pr(:DHT) is the complement of Pr(DHT).
Observe that P  is minimal ( 0) for reasonable values of
the various parameters. Also, we estimate the expected query
cost to deduce the non-existence. The user first searches for
an index entry and then employs flooding, hence,
Cs;  = C
S
s;  + C
U
s;  : (5)
B. Information-theoretic approach
In [6], [7], an information theoretic approach was proposed
to measure privacy offered by a system employing entropy H
as an anonymity metric, which is defined as:
H =  
X
i
pi log2 pi ; (6)
where pi is the attacker’s estimate of the probability that a
participant i was responsible for some observed action. En-
tropy is maximized to log2 jAj if equal probability is assigned
to all members of the anonymity set A, and it is minimized
at 0 when jAj = 1. According to [6], a system with entropy
H has effective anonymity set of size 2H . As an adversary
in PANACEA may have different information sets (i.e. each
resulting from different observations), conditional entropy H0
[7] is a more adequate metric, which is given by:
H0 =
X
y
Pr[Y = y]H(XjY = y) = EyH(XjY = y) ; (7)
where X is a random variable of the private aspect to be
preserved and Y is a random variable modeling different
observations y.
Next, we calculate the entropy of PANACEA for resource
anonymity against a searcher. To this end, the random variable
X models the existence of a resource, i.e. whether a resource
name from the resource namespace R exists in the system
or not. The random variable Y models the observations of
the searcher for a requested resource: (i) an authorized copy
is found in the DHT, (ii) an unauthorized copy is found in
the DHT and an authorized copy is found by flooding, (iii)
an unauthorized copy is found in the DHT but no authorized
copy is found by flooding, (iv) no copy is found in the DHT
and an authorized copy was found by flooding, and (v) no
copy is found in the DHT but no authorized copy was found
by flooding. In the information sets (i) and (ii), there is no
anonymity, thus entropy is 0. In the case of (iii), if the expected
provider list size of the queried resource is greater than the
maximum provider list size of any non-existing resource that
is inserted in the DHT for resource anonymization, then there
is no privacy and the resource is existent. Otherwise, the
probability assigned to any resource in the (m;n)-entry to
be existent is 1=m, because this key was inserted with a mix
of m keys. Thus, the anonymity set is m in that case. In
the observation (iv), the anonymity set is 1, as the queried
resource is found. Finally, in the case of (v), the anonymity
set is R, as the queried resource is not found and it can be
any of the resources in the resource namespace R. Therefore,
the resource entropy Hk for a searcher is given by:
HK = EiiiH(XjY = iii) + EvH(XjY = v)
=  (1  )Na(1  (1  )Nc Na)(1  PUK;a)
1(E(n0) < nf ) log2
1
m
  (1  )Nc (1  P
U
K;a) log2
1
jRj
;
(8)
where E(n0) is the expected provider list size in the (m;n)-
entry for the queried resource and nf is the maximum
provider list size for a phantom resource respectively. E(n0) =PNc Na
i=1
 
Nc Na
i

i(1 )(Nc Na i)(in)(1  fv) and 1() is
an indicator function.
Also, regarding provider anonymity, the random variable X
models the publisher of the requested resource and the random
variable Y models the information sets for the searcher as in
the case of resource anonymity. If the searcher has made the
observations (i), (ii), then the provider entropy is 0. In the
case (iii), where an entry for the requested resource is found
in the DHT, but not for an authorized copy, and no authorized
copy was found by flooding, we calculate H(XjY = iii)
according to the following logic: If the expected number of
providers for the requested resource as in the DHT is E(n0),
then the publisher of the requested resource can be either one
of these entries in the provider list or one peer in rest of the
system. Therefore, each peer in the provider list has probability
1=(E(n0) + 1) to be the publisher and any other peer has
probability 1=(E(n0) + 1)(N  E(n0)) to be the publisher of
the requested resource. If the observation (iv) is made by the
searcher, then the publisher is located and thus the entropy is
0. Finally, in the case of observation (v), the anonymity set is
the complete set N of peers in the system, as the publisher is
not located. Therefore, the provider entropy HV is:
HV =EiiiH(XjY = iii) + EvH(XjY = v)
=  (1  )Na(1  (1  )Nc Na)(1  PUK;a)
(E(n0)
1
E(n0) + 1
log2
1
E(n0) + 1
+
(N   E(n0))
1
(N   E(n0))(E(n0) + 1)
log2
1
(N   E(n0))(E(n0) + 1)
  (1  )Nc(1  PUK;a) log2
1
N
(9)
For a searcher that is authorized to a copy of the queried
resource, the resource and provider entropies are given by
eq. (8), (9) respectively. On the other hand, the resource and
provider entropies for an unauthorized searcher can be given
by eq. (8), (9) respectively by having Na = 0.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we verify our analysis and evaluate the
privacy and search efficiencies of the PANACEA system as
related to unstructured and structured access-controlled P2P
systems using simulation experiments.
In our simulated system (implemented in Java), we assume
N = 10000 peers that use the system both to publish and
search for resources. The PStores on the peers are initialized
with 25 random entries. The providers are organized in a
Kademlia-like structured topology, but they are also connected
over an unstructured overlay power-law network with average
degree 7:5 and maximum degree 150. We conducted two
types of simulation experiments, which differ in their resource
distributions and the type of the generated queries. Each
resource is randomly assigned a publisher peer and a list of
user peers who are authorized to access the resource. Any
other peer is said to be an unauthorized user for this resource
and publisher pair. We compute PV;a and PV;u as follows:
 PV;a = 1 if a user is able to contact a publisher where
he is authorized to access the requested resource.
 If the resource key is found in the DHT with a value list
of size n0, then PV;a = PV;u = 1n0 .
 Otherwise, if the resource key is not found in the DHT
and no authorized copy is located by flooding, then
PV;a = PV;u = 0.
The PANACEA’s parameters are taken as follows: key list size
m = 5, value list size n = 5 and forwarding probability  =
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0:6. Also, ttl = 4 was employed for limited-hop flooding in
the unstructured overlay.
A. Provider privacy and search cost
Initially, we aim to verify the correctness of eqs. (1), (3) us-
ing the simulation results with a rather static setting regarding
resource popularity. Speciafically, we assume 100 resources
with Nc = 50 copies for each (thus 5K resources in total).
100 peers are randomly selected, each of which is inserted into
the authorization list of random Na = 5 copies. Each resource
is then given to randomly chosen peers that publish them
using the PANACEA publishing mechanism. The collision
probability for provider lists is experimentally found to be
fv = 0:002. We also experimentally found that by searching
in the unstructured overlay PUV;a = 0:38, PV;u = P  = 0,
912 distinct nodes are visited and 1687 messages are sent
per query on the average. In order to measure PK;a; Cs;a, we
generate authorized searches from the above 100 authorized
peers for all of the 100 resources, thus 10K search queries
in total. Also, in order to measure PK;u; Cs;u, we randomly
select 100 unauthorized users that query the system for the
same 100 resources. These experiments have been run 10
times each and the mean values are plotted in Figures 3 to
6. As depicted in Figures 3, 4, the analytical equations model
the privacy properties of the simulated PANACEA system
very accurately. As the probability of publishing  increases,
PANACEA approaches the search efficiency of a structured
system (see Figure 3). Note that for only Na = 5 authorized
copies in the system, a small value of  = 0:6 makes the
search efficiency of PANACEA close to that of structured
systems. On the other hand, for unauthorized users, provider
privacy of our system is always close to that of unstructured
P2P systems, as shown in Figure 4. Therefore, PANACEA
design meets its privacy objectives of Section III. For  = 0,
PV;u = 0. When  = 0:1, a provider list is found in the DHT
for the queried resource, reducing the privacy in comparison
to  = 0. As  increases, so is the size of provider list of
the resource, and thus PV;u decreases. In Figure 5, the effect
of  on the search communication cost for authorized users
is depicted. As  increases, the probability to find a provider
where the user is authorized also increases. After  = 0:6,
there is no more search cost improvement, because the size
of the provider list of the queried resource slightly increases.
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As shown later, the search cost significantly decreases as 
increases. However, as observed from Figure 6, the search cost
for unauthorized users significantly increases (over the cost
of limited-hop flooding) with , which is a highly desirable
property of PANACEA.
Next, we evaluate the provider privacy and the search cost
of PANACEA for authorized and unauthorized users in a more
realistic setting, where 10K resources whose popularity (Nc)
follows Zipf distribution are published in the system. The
maximum number of resource copies is 150 and their mean
number is 10 thus resulting in a total of 100K resources. A
random number of 5 to 50 peers are chosen to be authorized to
each resource. Each resource of the 100K ones is randomly
assigned to a peer that initiates PANACEA publishing. We
randomly generate 20K number of authorized and unautho-
rized search queries separately. Again, the experiments are
repeated 10 times and mean values of the results are plotted
in Figure 7 to Figure 10. As depicted in Figure 7, search
efficiency increases with  for an authorized user. Also, as
shown in Figure 8, provider privacy is always minimal for
unauthorized users. Finally, Figure 9 depicts that the search
cost for authorized users decreases with , as opposed to that
of unauthorized users that increases with .
B. Resource privacy
As mentioned in Section II-A, resource privacy may be
breached by observing large sizes of the provider lists. Al-
though it is difficult to preserve resource privacy of highly
popular resources, we do not focus on them as their presence
in the system can be easily taken for granted. Our goal for
resource privacy in PANACEA is to preserve privacy for the
other resources.
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We observe that as long as an existing resource has a
provider list size less or equal to that of a phantom resource, an
adversary cannot differentiate between them. We assume again
100K resources Zipf-distributed with mean 10 and maximum
150 copies. Employing a small local static partition, of the
resource namespace R for resource anonymization, i.e. the
RL-approach with jRLj = 25, we observed that phantom keys
have provider lists longer than those of the 87:6 percentile
of the existing resources in the DHT (for  = 1). For this
percentile of resources, the resource privacy for unauthorized
users is PK;u = 1=m = 0:2 and for the authorized users is
PK;a = 1 for  = 1. For more popular resources, the adversary
can exploit the provider list sizes to conclude their existence.
Finally, by numerically evaluating eqs. (4) and (5) with
jRj = 2M , Nr = 100K,  = 1, we observed the PANACEA
system meets its design objectives in this case as well, as
P   P
U
 
and Cs;   CUs; . We omit the verification of
these formulas with simulations for brevity reasons.
C. System entropy
In Section III, we have defined the entropies for resource
anonymity and provider anonymity. This formulation allows
us to measure the privacy breach that can be achieved by
collusive groups of size c based on a simple modification
to the formulas: The provider list of the (m;n)-entry of
the queried resource will only contain E(n0)(1   c=N) non-
collusive entries. Employing the parameters of Section IV-B
with  = 0:6, nf = 20 and jRj = 2M , we numerically
evaluate the slighly modified versions of eqs. (8) and (9). As
depicted in Figures 11, 12, the anonymity set by PANACEA
for unauthorized users is 4:92  m for resource privacy and
the anonymity set for provider privacy is 36.7.
V. RELATED WORK
There is significant research work in the literature related to
PANACEA, particularly in the areas of access control in P2P
systems, privacy of access-controlled content, and anonymous
P2P systems.
To enable access control in P2P systems, PHera [8] proposes
a fine-grained access control framework based on super-peer-
based P2P overlays where the access-control policies of sub-
peers are enforced by the super-peers. Super peers index the
data of sub-peers and they could preserve data privacy by
not replying to the queries from unauthorized peers. However,
this approach assumes that all super-peers are unanimously
trusted by their sub-peers to enforce their data privacy and
access control policies, which is difficult in general [9]. In
PANACEA, peers can share their resources through index
hosted on untrusted nodes, and yet, can enforce access control.
Regarding the privacy of access-controlled content, a
privacy-preserving approach for centralized indexing of such
data is proposed in [9]. A group of data providers iteratively
circulate a bloom filter representing the content hosted on
the providers, bits of which are set probabilistically by the
proposed algorithm. At the end of this iterative process,
the index -represented by the bloom filter- emerges, which
preserves data privacy regarding its location (i.e. provider
privacy). However, as opposed to PANACEA, [9] does not
address resource privacy. Furthermore, new resources can
be easily inserted in the index of PANACEA, while index
reconstruction is required in [9].
The OneSwarm system proposed in [10] employs an un-
structured friend-to-friend overlay for privacy preserving con-
tent sharing. It preserves the privacy of a peer’s location using
cryptographic mechanisms. The system allows users to define
permissions for data sharing among trusted friends. Peers
search for data objects using flooding techniques, similarly
to access-controlled unstructured systems.
There exists a large number of works in the area of anony-
mous P2P systems that achieve publisher (source) or reader
(searcher) anonymity or both [1], [11], [4], [12]. Additionally,
the anonymity of a node hosting an index entry (resource)
is also considered [11]. In Freenet [1], resource identifiers
are generated in several cryptographic ways and are inserted
into the system based on these identifiers. It achieves access
control and resource and provider privacies using crypto-
graphic techniques, which however, involve complicated key
distribution and management overhead. Furthermore, resource
discovery is not guaranteed and involves significant search
communication overhead compared to structured systems. In
addition, the searchers have to be associated with the providers
a priori, in order to be informed about the cryptographic
keys. Instead, in our approach, search efficiency is high and
new searchers can be dynamically authorized by providers to
access the resources. P2P access control system based on such
cryptographic indexing was discussed in [2].
A hybrid P2P system involving structured and unstructured
topologies to achieve sender and receiver anonymity, was
discussed in [12] and referred to as Agyaat. Agyaat, provides
mutual anonymity for the sender and receiver, which is not
among the goals of PANACEA. Agyaat offers three alternative
resource discovery approaches: semantic groups, centralized
directory service, and dynamic services. In the first case, peers
that host semantically similar resources are grouped into a
cloud. Then, some sort of resource and provider privacies can
be provided at the expense of resource discovery, which is
flooding-based, as opposed to our approach. For improving
resource discovery, a centralized directory service or dynamic
services can be also employed. Then, a resource is mapped
to a cloud and the index is stored at a central server or at
the coordinator peers of the clouds in a distributed manner.
These are similar to the privacy preserving indexing employed
in [9]. However, Agyaat does not describe the anonymous
construction of this index and it does not analytically quantify
its effectiveness, as opposed to PANACEA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed PANACEA, a P2P in-
frastructure to share access-controlled data, which combines
high resource and provider privacies with high search ef-
ficiency for authorized users. We have analytically derived
the privacy and search efficiency properties of the system
employing probabilistic and information-theoretic approaches.
Our analysis was verified by simulation experiments, while we
analytically and experimentally showed that PANACEA meets
its design objectives. As a future work, we intend to employ
the mechanism in a Kademlia client and observe the privacy
offered in a real testbed.
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